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INTRODUCTION
The United States is exceptional among major industrialized coun-
tries in its lack of procedures for resolving typical workplace disputes.
Indeed, the workplace dispute resolution procedures that do exist in the
United States can better be described as a set of exceptions rather than as
a general system for resolving conflict. One set of exceptions is the pro-
cedures available in unionized workplaces where well-developed griev-
ance procedures provide employees with an effective means to challenge
unfair treatment.' At one time, it was hoped that union grievance and
arbitration procedures might provide the general foundation for work-
place dispute resolution in the United States.2 However, with union
membership having fallen below 13 percent of the workforce, the protec-
t Prof. Alexander J.S. Colvin, J.D., Ph.D. Dept. of Labor Studies and Industrial Rela-
tions, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802. Phone: (814) 865-0754.
Fax: (814) 863-9545. E-mail: ajclO@psu.edu. This paper was presented at the Fall 2003
Symposium of the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy.
1 See generally DAVID LEWIN & RICHARD B. PETERSON, THE MODERN GRIEVANCE PRO-
CEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES (1988) (discussing grievance procedures in steel manufactur-
ing, retail trade, nonprofit hospitals, and local public schools, and analyzing in particular the
"grievance filing, processing, settlement, and post-settlement behavior of the parties to the
procedures").
2 See generally Arnold M. Zack, Agreements to Arbitrate and Waiver of Rights Under
Employment Law, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS IN THE CHANG-
ING WORKPLACE 67, 69 (Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe, eds., 1999) (providing a
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tions afforded unionized workers are now an exception to the general
American pattern. 3 Another exception is the extensive legal protections
against discrimination in the workplace, enforced through the general
court systems. The breadth of legal protections and extent of remedies
available in the area of employment discrimination make American em-
ployment law far stronger in this respect than in other countries. 4 Yet,
these protections are limited to disputes involving discrimination, which
make up a relatively small proportion of workplace conflicts5 and are
based around a system of enforcement through litigation in the courts,
which can be costly and limit accessibility.6 The result is that for dis-
putes involving discrimination, employees can rely on litigation through
the courts, with its attendant costs and risks, while for the typical work-
place conflict involving a nonunion employee and a nondiscrimination
dispute, there is no effective workplace dispute resolution procedure
available.
Against this backdrop, we have seen some change in recent years in
the area of workplace dispute resolution. One of the most important
changes has come at the initiative of the courts with the development of
new doctrines of judicial deferral to employer-initiated arbitration proce-
dures for resolving legal claims by employees. 7 This type of arbitration,
often referred to as "mandatory arbitration" because it is typically man-
dated by employers as a term and condition of employment, reflects the
contradictions of workplace dispute resolution in the United States. Ad-
vocates see mandatory arbitration as a relatively low-cost, accessible sys-
tem for resolving workplace disputes that will avoid the expenses and
critical analysis of Gilmer v. htterstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 24 (1991), and the deci-
sion's impact on the law governing labor arbitration).
3 Union Membership (Annual): Union Members Summary, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (last modified January 21, 2004)
[hereinafter "Union Membership"].
4 See, e.g., Laura Beth Nielsen, Paying Workers or Paying Lawyers: Employee Termi-
nation Practices in the United States and Canada. 21 LAW & POL'Y 247, 248 (1999).
5 David Lewin, Dispute Resolution in the Nonunion Firm: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 31 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 465, 479 (1987) (finding that only 7 percent of all appeals of
management decisions in a sample of nonunion grievance procedures involved discrimination
claims).
6 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS 95-150, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION: MOST PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 5 (1995)
(stating that "almost any system is quicker, cheaper, and less harrowing than going to court").
7 See generally RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERI-
MENT IN EMPLOYMENT (1997) (providing legal background and comprehensive analysis of
compulsory arbitration); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employment Arbitration Under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS IN THE
CHANGING WORKPLACE 27-65 (Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe, eds., 1999) [hereinafter
"Stone, Employment Arbitration Under the FAA"] (discussing the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act).
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uncertainty of litigation in the general court system.8 Critics see
mandatory arbitration as undermining existing protections against em-
ployment discrimination provided by the public legal system while offer-
ing employees little in the way of fairness and accessibility for resolving
disputes. 9 Much of the debate surrounding mandatory arbitration has fo-
cused on how well it substitutes for litigation, determined, for example,
by examining the outcomes of arbitration cases and by comparing arbi-
tration procedures to those of the courts.10 In contrast, in this article I
will take a different perspective on mandatory arbitration and look at its
impact on dispute resolution at the workplace level. In particular, I will
look at survey and interview-based evidence on the expansion of
mandatory arbitration and how it is being used in the workplace. First,
though, I begin by reviewing the legal background giving rise to
mandatory arbitration.
I. FROM THE SUPREME COURT: THE LEGAL ORIGINS OF
MANDATORY ARBITRATION
The 1991 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/John-
son Lane Corp." gave rise to what are commonly referred to as
mandatory arbitration procedures. In Gilmer, the Supreme Court for the
first time held that a claim based on a right asserted under an employ-
ment statute could be subject to a private arbitration agreement between
an employee and his or her employer. 12 The effect of this decision was
that employers that required their employees' to enter into arbitration
agreements as a condition of employment became able to avoid more
8 See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employ-
ment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997) (discussing the benefits of predispute agreements
to arbitrate claims governed by federal and state employment laws); Samuel Estreicher,
Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Pre-Dispute Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 559 (2001) (arguing that arbitration is preferable
to a litigation-based system because it will provide more claimants with an adequate remedy).
9 See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employ-
ment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996) (dis-
cussing how mandatory arbitration arrangements can potentially undermine worker rights and
arguing that workers should not be permitted to waive their rights under federal and state
employment statutes); see also David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Busi-
ness: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis.
L. REV. (1997) (discussing how compelled arbitration confers corporate defendants with inor-
dinate leverage against employee-claimants resulting in "despotic decisionmaking").
10 See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EM-
PLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'v J. 189 (1997) (discussing how employers, as repeat players in the
arbitration process, benefit from their experience and from the structure of the arbitration pro-
cess); see also Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment
Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIo ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 777 (2003).
11 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
12 Id. at 36.
2004]
584 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13:581
types of in-court litigation. 13 If an employee subject to a mandatory arbi-
tration agreement wanted to make a legal claim against his or her em-
ployer, for example for discrimination in the workplace or sexual
harassment, the claim had to be brought through the arbitration proce-
dure described in the agreement; the employee was barred from appeal-
ing directly to the courts.' 4 This forced a large number of employees to
bring their claims through an arbitration procedure designed by the very
same employer against whom they were bringing a claim. Employers
soon recognized the potential of using mandatory arbitration to avoid the
risks and occasionally massive damage awards of litigation and began
adopting these procedures in large numbers.' 5
It is important to note that mandatory arbitration is a development
that almost exclusively affected nonunion employees. 16 Although there
were some attempts to introduce mandatory arbitration in unionized
workplaces, the vast majority of mandatory arbitration procedures were
introduced in nonunion workplaces where the employees had no effec-
tive say over their adoption.' 7 For nonunion employees, mandatory arbi-
tration was a particularly troubling development because it undercut the
threat of employment litigation, which provides one of the few institu-
tional checks on employers in the absence of unions.18
In a series of court battles during the 1990s, employers successfully
defended the use of mandatory employment arbitration against chal-
lenges that the procedures inherently undermined the statutory rights of
employees.1 9 Efforts to introduce legislation in Congress aimed at re-
versing the Gilmer decision were unsuccessful. 20 In 2001, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its acceptance of mandatory arbitration to resolve em-
ployment disputes in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.2 1 However,
some courts have been willing to strike down arbitration procedures that
13 See id.
14 See id.
15 Alexander J. S. Colvin, Institutional Pressures, Human Resource Strategies, and the
Rise of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 375 (2003).
16 See Stone, supra note 9, at 1036-38 (arguing that, in the non-union setting, pre-hire
arbitral agreements are blatant contracts of adhesion).
17 See id., at 1017, 1036-37.
18 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Plainly, it would not comport
with the congressional objectives behind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected by
Title VII to allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to contract away the right to
enforce civil remedies in the courts.") (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,
450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
19 Hill, supra note 10, at 777.
20 Sherwyn, David S. & Tracey, J. Bruce, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Dis-
putes: Implications for Policy and Practice, CORNELL HOTEL & RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q., Vol.
60, October 1, 2001.
21 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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contain particularly egregious violations of due process. 22 For example,
courts have refused to enforce arbitration agreements that restrict em-
ployee damage awards, require employees to pay half of the arbitration
costs (which may amount to thousands of dollars or that impose one-
sided obligations to arbitrate), or that allow the employer access to the
courts while the employee is forced to arbitrate. 23 In the vast majority of
cases, however, the courts have enforced mandatory arbitration agree-
ments where the procedures do not include any egregiously one-sided
provisions. 24
II. THE EXPANSION OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN
THE WORKPLACE
In light of the courts' general willingness to enforce mandatory arbi-
tration procedures, the key factor in the expansion of mandatory arbitra-
tion is the decision by companies whether or not to adopt this type of
procedure. The advantage of adopting mandatory arbitration is that it
allows companies to avoid litigation by channeling employee legal
claims out of the courts and into an alternative forum. This is sensible
for companies if they view arbitration as having lower costs and lower
risks than litigation. From a risk perspective, arbitration before a profes-
sional arbitrator will appear more attractive to companies to the extent
that managers fear exposure to large jury awards in litigation. Arbitra-
tion will also seem beneficial where managers fear that litigation will be
protracted and involve substantial legal expenses. Yet, on the other
hand, there are reasons companies might be wary of mandatory arbitra-
tion. First, there is uncertainty about the effectiveness of this relatively
new tool for resolving employee claims, as, until recently, arbitration
clauses were subject to some legal doubts concerning their enforceabil-
ity. Second, there are concerns about the costs of arbitration, of which
the employer will have to bear at least half.25 Finally, companies may
not view the threat of employment litigation as being sufficiently serious
22 Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration
Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 249 (2003).
23 See, e.g., Cole v. Bums International Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Armedariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000); see
generally Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Relationship Between Employment Arbitration and
Workplace Dispute Resolution Procedures, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 643 (2001).
24 See LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 22.
25 See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1481; see also Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An
Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration
Association, 18 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 777 (2003) (reporting statistics showing that
employers pay more than half of the costs of employment arbitration); Michael H. LeRoy &
Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution?: The Ever
Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2002); Dennis R.
Nolan, Employment Arbitration After Circuit City, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 853, 874 (2003).
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to bother taking extensive measures to avoid it. On the contrary, a num-
ber of managers expressed concern in interview based research that
adopting a mandatory arbitration procedure could be interpreted by em-
ployees as a signal that they had a new type of workplace dispute resolu-
tion mechanism available and hence lead to a surge in the number of
complaints lodged by employees. 26
What does the empirical evidence tell us about the extent of expan-
sion of mandatory arbitration? The results of four surveys that have in-
vestigated the extent to which organizations have adopted mandatory
arbitration procedures are summarized in Table 1 below. This survey
evidence suggests that the expansion of mandatory arbitration since the
Gilmer decision in 1991 has been substantial, though at present only a
minority of companies has adopted these procedures. As a rough starting
point, a 1991 survey of human resources managers who were alumni of a
master's degree program in industrial relations and human resources in-
dicated that 2.1% of the companies they worked for had adopted
mandatory arbitration procedures covering nonunion employees. 27 This
is likely a high-end estimate of the extent of mandatory arbitration be-
cause the survey population probably over sampled larger organizations
with relatively sophisticated human resource management policies. 28 A
1995 survey by the General Accounting Office (GAO) of firms subject to
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reporting require-
ments indicated that around 7.6% of the firms used mandatory arbitration
procedures. 29 Again, this survey population may be skewed towards
companies with relatively sophisticated policies since the survey was di-
rected at establishments that were legally required to comply with EEOC
reporting requirements. 30 Still, this suggests that by the mid-1990s there
was already substantial growth in the adoption of mandatory arbitration.
Two subsequent surveys conducted by the author suggest further expan-
sion of mandatory arbitration in the late 1990s. A 1998 survey of estab-
lishments in the telecommunications industry indicated that 16.3% of
26 Alexander J.S. Colvin, Citizens and Citadels: Dispute Resolution and the Governance
of Employment Relations (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file
with author).
27 See Peter Feuille & Denise R. Chachere, Looking Fair and Being Fair: Remedial
Voice Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces, 21 J. MGMT. 27, 31-32, 36 (1995).
28 Id. at 30, 32.
29 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS 95-150, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
MOST PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 12 (1995). In
response to an initial question on the GAO survey, 9.9% of employers reported having
mandatory arbitration procedures. However, when these companies were subsequently asked
by the GAO for further information on their procedures, a number of them indicated that they
in fact did not have mandatory arbitration procedures, reducing the effective incidence of pro-
cedures to 7.6%. Id.
30 See id. at 20.
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these organizations had adopted mandatory arbitration. 31 A subsequent
2003 survey of establishments in the telecommunications industry indi-
cated that 14.1% had adopted mandatory arbitration.32 Although some
establishments were surveyed in both time periods, the 1998 and 2003
surveys did not involve identical samples. Therefore, the small drop in
the incidence of mandatory arbitration cannot be interpreted directly as
organizations abandoning such procedures. Major restructuring in the
telecommunication industries during this time period meant that many
establishments closed and new ones opened, which may account for part
of the difference.
TABLE 1: EXTENT OF ADOPTION OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION
Mandatory
Arbitration
Author(s) Year Sample Incidence
Feuille & Chachere 1992 Alumni of masters in IR/HR program 2.1%
(n=195)
GAO 1995 Establishments subject to EEOC reporting 7.6%
requirements (n=1448)
Colvin 1998 Telecommunications industry establishments 16.3%
(n=213)
Colvin 2003 Telecommunications industry establishments 14.1%
(n=291)
Taken together though, the results suggest that, after rapid expan-
sion in the 1990s, growth of mandatory arbitration may have slowed.
This suggestion is supported by the adoption dates of mandatory arbitra-
tion procedures found in the 2003 survey from the telecommunications
industry. Data on the dates of adoption of human resource practices need
to be interpreted with some caution because organizations often do not
keep records of and cannot always provide accurate information on adop-
tion dates.33 However, a number of the establishments were able to pro-
vide dates for the adoption of mandatory arbitration and these results are
summarized in Table 2.
31 Colvin, supra note 15, at 375, 386.
32 Rosemary Batt, Alex Colvin, Harry Katz & Jeffrey Keefe, Telecoms 2004: Strategy,
HR Practices & Performance, Final report of the Cornell-Rutgers Telecommunications Project,
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY (2004) (unpublished survey) (on file with author).
33 Survey Research Institute at Cornell, Telecom2 Final Code Book, July 29, 2002, at
193 (unpublished survey) (on file with author) (showing forty of eighty respondents surveyed
could not estimate year of adoption of mandatory arbitration procedures).
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TABLE 2: YEAR OF ADOPTION OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES
IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
6
5.
3
2
0-
pre- 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1995
The first thing to note about the dates of adoption is that the vast majority
of mandatory arbitration procedures were adopted after 1994. This sug-
gests that the shift in the law following the Supreme Court's Gilmer deci-
sion provided the impetus for the expansion of mandatory arbitration,
rather than merely signifying a mere ratification of a practice already in
common usage. Adoption was more frequent in the mid-1990s before
dropping off in 1998 and 1999 and then picking up again through 2002.
The data here is limited, but it suggests a general expansion of
mandatory arbitration since the mid-1990s with a possible temporary
slowdown in the late 1990s. Possible reasons for a slowdown in the late
1990s could include legal uncertainty over the status of mandatory arbi-
tration during court challenges to procedures during that period and a
lack of pressure to avoid litigation during the tight job markets of the late
1990s. However, it appears that employers have continued to adopt
mandatory arbitration clauses through 2002, the latest year for which
data is available.
The latest estimates from the telecommunications industry surveys
suggest an incidence of mandatory arbitration in somewhere in the range
of 15% of establishments. If this industry is typical in this respect (there
are no obvious reasons to think it is unusual), then mandatory arbitration
has become over a period of a little more than a decade since the Gilmer
decision a workplace dispute resolution procedure that governs a signifi-
cant portion of the American workforce. Although an estimate in the
range of 15% may not seem particularly large, it is worth remembering
that unionization in the United States is now under 14% of the
workforce. 34 Over a relatively short period of time, mandatory arbitra-
tion has become a system for workplace dispute resolution that should be
34 Union Membership, supra note 3.
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considered as important as union grievance procedures. This suggests
the need to turn to the issue of how these mandatory arbitration proce-
dures are being used.
III. MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND WORKPLACE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION ACTIVITY
Most existing attempts to investigate how mandatory arbitration is
functioning have involved studies of collections of arbitration decisions;
in particular, sets of decisions from the files of the American Arbitration
Association or from the securities industry's arbitration procedures. 35
These studies provide useful insight into the arbitration decision-making
process and are valuable for comparing the outcomes of litigation and
arbitration. An alternative way to look at the impact of mandatory arbi-
tration is to examine its effect on the process of dispute resolution in the
workplace. This section will describe the results of an analysis of the
impact of mandatory arbitration on workplace dispute resolution activity
based on data from the 1998 survey of telecommunications industry
firms discussed earlier.
When examining workplace dispute resolution activity, one of the
most basic statistical indicators is the grievance rate, which is often mea-
sured as the annual number of grievances filed per 100 employees in a
given workplace. 36 From the employer's perspective, a high grievance
rate can indicate excessive amounts of conflict in the workplace, perhaps
reflecting worker discontent with some aspect of workplace manage-
ment. By contrast, when we are comparing different types of grievance
procedures, an especially low grievance rate can be of concern because it
indicates a lack of employee trust in the fairness or efficacy of the dis-
pute resolution procedure.
In the first column of Table 3, grievance rates are reported for four
different types of grievance procedures based on data from the telecom-
munications industry survey. The grievance rates are reported for griev-
ances about disciplinary and dismissal decisions only so as to adjust for
the fact that procedures may differ in the categories of disputes that they
cover, thereby influencing the overall grievance rate. Using annual disci-
plinary grievance rates as a standard unit of comparison, the highest
rate-5.3 per 100 employees-is found in union grievance procedures.
It is not surprising to find higher grievance rates for union than nonunion
35 See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 10, at 189-220.
36 See, e.g., DAVID LEWIN & RICHARD B. PETERSON, THE MODERN GRIEVANCE PROCE-
DURE IN THE UNTIED STATES (Quorum 1988); Peter Cappelli & Keith Chauvin, A Test of an
Efficiency Model of Grievance Activity, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3 (Oct. 1991); David
Lewin, Grievance Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces: An Empirical Analysis of Usage, Dy-
namics, and Outcomes, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 823 (1990).
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procedures. 37 More surprising is the finding that grievance rates were
higher for nonunion procedures that included mandatory arbitration-3.2
per 100 employees-than for other nonunion procedures-1.3 per 100
employees. These differences in grievance rates are affected by differ-
ences in underlying levels of conflict in the workplace. However, a simi-
lar pattern results when we adjust for differences in the number of
disciplinary decisions by examining the percentage of disciplinary deci-
sions appealed. The highest disciplinary appeal proportion is for union
procedures at 55%, with the lowest appeal proportion for other nonunion
procedures at 11%, and with nonunion procedures that include
mandatory arbitration occupying a middle position at 34%.
TABLE 3: MEAN DISCIPLINARY GRIEVANCE RATES AND APPEAL
PROPORTIONS BY TYPE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE
38
Disciplinary grievance rate: Appeal proportion:
(Annual grievances per (Percentage of discipline
100 employees) decisions appealed)
Union Procedures 5.3*** 55%***
Nonunion procedures:
Mandatory arbitration 3.2*** 34%***
Peer review 2.9** 30%**
Other nonunion procedures 1.3 11%
*p<.10; **p<.05 ; ***p<.Ol: rates significantly higher than for "other nonunion procedures"
category.
These results are surprising if we view them in light of concerns
about the due process protections available in mandatory arbitration.
However, we need to consider that most of these comparisons look at
mandatory arbitration versus litigation in the court system. When we are
looking at workplace dispute resolution procedures, the base comparison
category is "other nonunion procedures," which are most commonly
grievance procedures in which employees have to lodge a complaint with
a higher level manager in the organization, who will in turn render a
decision on the employee's grievance. Viewed from the perspective of a
grievance procedure based on unilateral management decision-making,
mandatory arbitration may appear to be an improvement in due process,
even if it falls short of the standards available in the courts or in union
grievance procedures.
37 See David Lewin & Richard B. Peterson, The Nonunion Grievance Procedure: A Via-
ble System of Due Process?, 3(1) EMPLOYEE RESPONSIBILITIES & RIGHTS J. 1 (1990); Peter
Feuille & John T. Delaney, The Individual Pursuit of Organizational Justice: Grievance Pro-
cedures in Nonunion Workplaces, 10 RES. IN PERSONNEL AND HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 187
(Gerald R. Ferris & Kendrith M. Rowland eds., 1992); see also Alexander J.S. Colvin, The
Dual Transformation of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 42 INDUS. REL. 712, 725 (2003).
38 Table based on results reported in Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Dual Transformation of
Workplace Dispute Resolution, 42 INDUS. REL. 712 (2003).
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Some support for this notion is provided when we consider another
type of nonunion workplace dispute resolution procedure that involves
non-managerial decision-makers-namely, peer review. Under peer re-
view procedures, a panel of "peer" employees decides whether or not an
employee's grievance will be successful. 39 Peer review procedures are
distinctive in that all, or a majority, of the members of the panel are not
managers, but workers at the same level in the organization as the griev-
ant.4 0 Table 3 compares the results for both types of procedures. The
table shows a high degree of similarity between mandatory arbitration
and peer procedures in both disciplinary grievance rates-3.2 and 2.9 per
100 employees respectively-and disciplinary appeal percentages-34%
and 30% respectively. The similarity between the procedures suggests a
common effect of non-managerial decision-makers boosting employee
usage of procedures.
TABLE 4: MEAN EMPLOYEE SUCCESS RATES BY TYPE OF PROCEDURE
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GRIEVANCES AND OF DISCIPLINARY DECISIONS
4 1
Successful Appeals as Successful Appeals as
a Percentage of a Percentage of
Type of Procedure Disciplinary Grievances Disciplinary Decisions
Union grievance procedures 36.4 17.3***
Nonunion procedures:
Mandatory arbitration 36.4 11.1**
Peer review 30.0 9.9*
Other nonunion procedures 46.4 2.7
*p<.10; **p<.05 ; ***p<.01: success rates significantly higher than for "other nonunion procedures"
category.
Thus far, this article has examined employee usage of workplace
dispute resolution procedures, but it is also worth exploring to what de-
gree employees are actually successful in using the procedures to reverse
management decisions. Table 4 reports the success rates for the four
different categories of procedures. The results suggest minimal differ-
ence between procedures when looking simply at the percentage of disci-
plinary grievances in which employees are successful in appealing a
decision. Peer review procedures have the lowest employee success rate
at 30.0%, union grievance procedures and mandatory arbitration are tied
in the middle at 36.4%, and, surprisingly, other nonunion procedures
39 See generally Feuille & Delaney, supra note 37; Douglas M. McCabe, Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Employee Voice in Nonunion Employment: An Ethical Analysis of
Organizational Due Process Procedures and Mechanisms - The Case of the United States, 16
J. Bus. ETHICS 349; Alexander J.S. Colvin, Institutional Pressures, Human Resource Strate-
gies, and the Rise of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
375, 380 (2003).
40 See supra note 39.
41 See supra note 39.
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have the highest employee success rate at 46.4%. In comparing success
rates, however, it must be acknowledged that employees are intelligent
actors in choosing whether or not to file grievances. If an employee be-
lieves that a procedure offers little prospect of redress through appealing
a disciplinary decision, he or she is less likely to go to the trouble of
filing a grievance. In particular, if employees are concerned about due
process issues and the danger of retaliation for filing a grievance, they
are more likely to only file grievances where they have a particularly
strong case. Therefore, the percentage of all disciplinary decisions that
are successfully reversed by employee grievances, regardless of whether
a grievance is filed, provides a better measure of the impact of the dis-
pute resolution procedure in the workplace. The last column of Table 4
reports the percentage of disciplinary decisions successfully appealed for
each procedure category. Union grievance procedures have the highest
percentage of decisions successfully appealed at 17.3%, whereas other
nonunion procedures have the lowest percentage at 2.7%. In the middle
are nonunion procedures involving mandatory arbitration at 11.1% and
peer review at 9.9%.
What light do these results for workplace dispute resolution activity
shed on mandatory arbitration? One general point is that our perspective
on mandatory arbitration may vary depending on the reference point for
comparison. The due process protections in mandatory arbitration have
been compared unfavorably with those offered by the court system.42
Similar negative comparisons can be made between union grievance pro-
cedures and mandatory arbitration, particularly in regard to the represen-
tation role of the union. The results examined in this article support the
notion that mandatory arbitration does not provide a level of workplace
dispute resolution procedure akin to that of union grievance procedures.
On the other hand, mandatory arbitration may appear more favorable if
the reference point is typical nonunion dispute resolution procedures that
feature management decision-makers. Compared to these other nonun-
ion procedures, mandatory arbitration does appear to be associated with
greater employee usage and more success in overturning management
decisions.
These results may suggest a potentially positive impact of
mandatory arbitration on workplace dispute resolution, but a couple of
additional questions need to be considered in this regard. One question
is whether any benefits to workplace dispute resolution are outweighed
by costs to the enforcement of public employment laws. The answer to
this question will depend in part on how one evaluates the effectiveness
and appropriateness of mandatory arbitration as a substitute for litigation
42 See Stone, supra note 9, at 1039.
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through the court system. 43 Another question, however, is whether
mandatory arbitration is a necessary or desirable way to structure work-
place dispute resolution procedures. In the next section, I will describe
one alternative approach to reforming workplace dispute resolution pro-
cedures that organizations have attempted.
IV. ALTERNATIVE TRAJECTORIES FOR WORKPLACE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS
A key characteristic of mandatory arbitration is that the Gilmer de-
cision simply allowed companies to introduce arbitration procedures as a
substitute for litigation; it did not determine the structure of these proce-
dures.44 Although subsequent decisions have refused to enforce some
egregiously one-sided arbitration provisions, in general, organizations
are free to adopt the type of procedure they wish. 45 In particular, organi-
zations can choose to combine mandatory arbitration with other dispute
resolution procedures in a multi-stage procedure. 46 Most dispute resolu-
tion procedures in nonunion workplaces in fact consist of multi-stage
grievance procedures. 47 For example, in the 2003 telecommunications
industry survey described earlier, the typical (median) nonunion dispute
resolution procedure involved a three-step grievance procedure. 48 Under
these multi-step procedures, employees typically begin the process by
filing a grievance with a lower level manager.49 If the grievance is un-
resolved at the first step, higher levels of management consider the griev-
ance. 50 The procedure may incorporate other features, such as mediation
at some step.51 Mandatory arbitration and peer review procedures are
often incorporated into these procedures as the final step in the multi-
stage procedure. 52 The result is that there are a variety of options open to
companies in designing nonunion workplace dispute resolution proce-
dures, and consequently, there is substantial variation in the nature of
these procedures.5 3 Although some procedures are characterized by a
"race to the bottom" style effort to ensure management retains control of
43 See, e.g., Theodore 0. Rogers Jr., The Procedural Differences Between Litigating in
Court and Arbitration: Who Benefits?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 633 (2001).
44 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
45 See Colvin, supra note 23, at 645-46.
46 See id. at 645-55.
47 Id. at 649.
48 See Colvin, supra note 23.
49 See Colvin, supra note 23, at 645-50.
50 See id.
51 See id. at 645-55.
52 See id. at 648-50.
53 See id. at 645-55.
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the process regardless of due process, other procedures include features
that enhance their fairness to employees.54
One company that adopted a set of procedures that include a num-
ber of innovative features is TRW, a diversified aerospace and automo-
tive parts manufacturing company.55 The development of TRW's
workplace dispute resolution procedures provides an intriguing example
of a possible alternative trajectory of the development of mandatory arbi-
tration. The initial impetus for development of the procedures at TRW
came from a relatively conventional source. In the early 1990s, the com-
pany laid off a large number of employees in its aerospace business as a
result of the post-Cold War contraction of the military aerospace indus-
try. 5 6 Many of these employees were long serving professional and man-
agerial employees who were entering the labor market as their entire
industry was contracting. This wave of downsizing produced a backlash
in the form of an upsurge of employment litigation.57 Confronted by this
sudden rise in litigation costs, the company decided to consider adopting
a mandatory arbitration procedure in light of the then recently decided
Gilmer case.58
Rather than simply adopting a standard mandatory arbitration proce-
dure, however, TRW engaged in an extended investigation directed at
integrating its dispute resolution procedures with its overall human re-
sources (HR) strategies. 59 A particular concern for the company was that
it had for many years emphasized a high commitment-oriented HR strat-
egy with its employees. Management feared that employees might view
a mandatory arbitration procedure as designed to undermine their legal
rights.60 As a result, the company decided to restructure the arbitration
procedure so that it would provide an alternative mechanism for resolv-
ing disputes, but would not be viewed by employees as a "take-away" of
their rights. 6' The first important feature of the procedure was that
mandatory arbitration would be introduced as a final step on top of, or in
addition to, other workplace dispute resolution procedures. 62 In conjunc-
tion with the introduction of mandatory arbitration, individual divisions
of TRW engaged in a process of reviewing and revising their existing
54 See id.
55 For a more detailed examination of the TRW case study, see Alexander J.S. Colvin,
Adoption and Use of Dispute Resolution Procedures in the Nonunion Workplace, in vol. 13,
ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS 71 (David Lewin & Bruce E. Kaufman, eds.,
2004).
56 See id. at 19.
57 Id.
58 See id. at 20-21.
59 See id. at 9.
60 Id. at 22.
61 Colvin, supra note 55.
62 Id. at 23-29.
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workplace procedures. In many cases, TRW upgraded these procedures
through features such as the addition of a mediation step prior to arbitra-
tion. 63 The second important feature was that although arbitration would
be mandatory, it would be non-binding for the employee, but binding for
the employer.64 This meant that employees would be required to take
disputes initially to arbitration, but if not satisfied with the results of
arbitration they could proceed to court; the employer would be bound by
the results of arbitration whatever the outcome.
How has the procedure worked in practice? When TRW initially
introduced the procedure, it attracted a lot of attention due to the unusual
feature of having non-binding arbitration. 65 Yet, in practice, very few of
the disputes have gone to arbitration. 66 The vast majority of disputes are
settled either in the preliminary grievance steps or in mediation prior to
arbitration. 67 Indeed, the striking feature when talking to employees of
TRW involved in dispute resolution is how much of the attention is fo-
cused on the preliminary steps in the procedure before arbitration. Dur-
ing the initial three years that the procedure was in place, of the 72 cases
that reached the mediation stage, only three subsequently went to arbitra-
tion.68 Time needed to resolve cases in mediation was relatively low,
with cases averaging only three to four months from the initial claim
through resolution in mediation.69 Mediation costs were also relatively
low, averaging around $2000 per case.70 More significantly from an em-
ployee perspective, many of the mediation settlements included contin-
ued employment. The remedies included reinstatements, adjustments of
the application of company policies, and transferal of employees to new
jobs within the company. 7' A major weakness of litigation as an em-
ployment dispute resolution system is that most cases involve terminated
employees, so continued employment is not a plausible outcome. The
ability of the TRW workplace dispute resolution procedure to allow con-
tinued employment is a major strength of the system.
What does the TRW example tell us about mandatory arbitration?
In one sense, it is a positive example of how, with the expansion of
mandatory arbitration, some companies are introducing workplace dis-
pute resolution procedures that enhance the resolution of conflict to the
benefit of employees as well as the company. In this respect, this exam-
63 Id.
64 See id. at 22.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 27.
67 Id.
68 Colvin, supra note 55, at 27.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 28.
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pie fits with the positive message from the grievance rate statistics de-
scribed in the previous section. 72 On the other hand, it is not clear that
the strengths of the TRW system are a product of mandatory arbitration
itself. Arbitration raised possibilities that provided the initial impetus for
restructuring TRW's workplace dispute resolution procedures, but the
major benefits appear to have come from mediation and the enhanced
earlier stages in the procedure rather than from arbitration itself. Further-
more, TRW has had success with a procedure that makes arbitration
mandatory but non-binding, whereas a key feature often advocated on
behalf of mandatory arbitration is that it could be made binding. This
suggests the possibility of a system of nonunion workplace dispute reso-
lution procedures that offers the benefits of expanded access to resolution
of conflict in the workplace and an alternative mechanism for resolving
claims before they turn into litigation, without the problematic feature of
an employer-imposed binding mandatory arbitration barring all access to
the courts.
CONCLUSION
The expansion of mandatory arbitration procedures is a striking ex-
ample of a shift in employment relations practices at the workplace level
directly resulting from a change in the interpretation of the law at the
Supreme Court level. The expanded deferral to employer-initiated,
mandatory arbitration procedures has raised concerns about the under-
mining of public employment laws by the establishment of private dis-
pute resolution procedures in which employers design the structures
within which they are a party. While mandatory arbitration raises obvi-
ous concerns about the normal enforcement of employment laws through
the public court system, it is also important to understand the impact of
mandatory arbitration from the perspective of workplace dispute resolu-
tion. The dominant characteristic of workplace dispute resolution in the
United States is the absence of effective procedures for most workers to
resolve typical employment disputes. The question is what impact
mandatory arbitration is having on this landscape. The limited evidence
available so far indicates that mandatory arbitration is already having a
significant impact on a segment of the workforce because companies are
increasingly adopting these procedures. Perhaps more surprisingly, there
is substantial usage of workplace dispute resolution procedures that in-
corporate mandatory arbitration and that allow an increased number of
nonunion employees to successfully challenge management decisions.
On the other hand, it is not clear that workplace dispute resolution proce-
dures need to be binding in the sense of preventing subsequent appeal to
72 See supra Table 3 and Table 4.
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the courts, or even need to involve arbitration to have these effects. Peer
review procedures, another type of workplace dispute resolution proce-
dure involving non-managerial decision-makers, result in increased
employee usage rates similar to those of mandatory arbitration. Further-
more, where a multi-stage procedure combines arbitration with media-
tion, it appears that mediation rather arbitration can actually play the
dominant role in improving workplace dispute resolution procedures. In
general, although mandatory arbitration has its weaknesses in enforcing
public law, it is important not to ignore the pressing need in American
workplaces to enhance dispute resolution procedures for the majority of
employees who lack union representation. To the degree that legal pres-
sures can provide an impetus for organizations to enhance their work-
place dispute resolution procedures, they will be a positive development.

